This paper deals with the design of the secure network of the Enhanced Internet of Vehicles Blockchain Governance Game by using the . The BGG is the system model of the stochastic game to find best strategies towards preparation for preventing a network malfunction by an attacker. The paper applies the stochastic game model into the connected vehicle security. Analytically tractable results for decision making parameters are fully obtained which enable to predict the moment for safety operations and to deliver the optimal combination of the number of reserved nodes and the acceptance probability of the backups to protect the Blockchain enabled IoV network in a connected car. This research helps for whom considers the enhanced secure IoV architecture with the BGG within the decentralized network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Connected cars communicate each other based on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication and it typically means that car are equipped with Internet access, and usually also with a wireless local area network. Each care supports enhanced driving aids for full autonomous driving by using the artificial intelligence (AI) and its maneuvers [1] . The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a superset of the connected car which contains sensors, GPS, entertainment systems, brakes and throttles in the car. The IoV is a moving network made up of IoT enabled cars through the usage of modern electronics and the integrated information to maintain traffic flow, and to perform more effective fleet management and accident avoidance. [2] [3] . The IoV is connected in an ad hoc network that uses each IoT component in a vehicle as a node [3] .
Recently, adapting Blockchain technology with the IoV has attracted increasing the attention of researchers and developers because of decentralization, anonymity, and trust characteristics of Blockchain [4] [5] [6] . In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), data sharing among vehicles is critical to improve driving safety and enhance vehicular services. To ensure security and tractability of data sharing, existing studies utilize consensus schemes as hard security solutions to establish Blockchain enabled IoV (BIoV) [5] . Some studies have proposed a decentralized trust management system for vehicle data credibility assessment using Blockchain with joint Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus schemes [6] [7] [8] . Vehicle manufacturers Volkswagen [9] and Ford [10] have applied for patents that enable secure inter-vehicle communication through blockchain technologies. In the view point of the IoT securities, several studies are dealing with similar topics regarding the Blockchain based IoT securities [11] [12] [13] . But most studies are based on surveys [11] and none of them are analytically approached for design the network architecture for the Blockchain based IoT [12] [13] .
The Enhanced BIoV (EBIoV) network [14] is emphasized in this paper. The EBIoV is the IoV network architecture based on the Edge Computing [15] [16] with enabling the Blockchain Governance Game (BGG) [17] for improving the network security [14] . Atypical BIoV could be applied to trace the provenance of spare parts back through every step in the supply chain to its original manufacture date and location [14, 18] . Car manufacturers concern that service centers and garages are knowingly fitting counterfeit spare parts to their vehicles of customers [15] . Counterfeit parts damage the brand reputation when the parts becomes a cause of accidents. Identifying geniality of car parts by using the EBIoV has been introduced in the previous research [11] and it suggests that the network within car components is considered as the Edge network and the monitoring equipment in car service centers are Fog level and the database in the headquarter (HQ) is the level of the cloud network (see Fig.1 ) [15] [16] 19] . [14] This paper provides the mathematical functional of the EBIoV network architecture for enhancing the securities from attackers. The EBIoV security regarding counterfeits of the car parts already has been studied [14] and this research is focused on avoiding atypical IoV attack in a decentralized network (i.e., the 51 percent attack). In the BGG [17] , an attacker and a defender compete each other by building blocks in private and public chains as the sequence of stages to generate ledgers. The historical strategies and the probabilistic stage transitions can be observed by both an attacker and a defender. Hence, the interaction between the attacker and the defender can be modeled as a stochastic game [17, 20] . This joint functional between two players of the predicted time of the first observed threshold which is crossing the half of the total nodes along with values of each component upon this time. The defender (a car company) could take the preliminary action (i.e., request to add honest nodes as safety modes) for protecting the Blockchain in a vehicle.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the Enhanced BIoV (EBIoV) network and it describes how to construct EBIoV architecture of a vehicle by using the BGG model in the IoV network as a stochastic game between an attacker and a defender. Once a dishonest blocks are generated, the model predicts how many blocks will be generated and the moment until more than a half nodes are covered by an attacker. The moment of the decision making is also analyzed in this section. The framework for setting up the mixed strategic game is provided in Section 3. The optimal values of the blockchain governance in the EBIoV network for the memoryless case are analytically calculated in Section 4. The memoryless property implies that a defender does not spend additional resources to store past information.
II. S G F BI V N S TOCHASTIC AME OR O ETWORK ECURITY
The Blockchain Governance Game (BGG) [14] has been tried to be adapted the BIoV network architecture to defend against the attacks. This system model consists of one attacker (i.e., the miner which intends to fork a private chain) and one defender (the miner which honestly mines on the public chain) [20] . This explicit function (Theorem BGG-1) from the BGG (Blockchain Governance Game) gives the predicted moment one step before the 51 percent attack [17] .
Enhanced IoV Network Structure
The proposed BIoV network structure is considered [14] and the components in a vehicle, the equipment of a service center and the HQ database are hooked up as one Blockchain (see Fig. 2 ). Each car component beside the CPU (smart controller) generate the value based on its mechanical action and the generated values are sharing with all other components including assigned service centers and a company headquarter. Each number from the car component is unique and randomly generated. And sharing these generated number is the transaction value in the Blockchain network. The service center have the database which contains the information from the cars which are served by the center and the unique value based on the registered car database could be generated for sharing with other nodes including a company headquarter.
Unlike atypical Blockchain network, the EBIoV network does not have reward system which means that a heavy computation power is not required for being a miner to generate ledger. All nodes even in service centers and a HQ have same contribution power and the equal chance to be a miner. For instance, the node in the CPU is considered as same as the nodes in other car parts although the CPU controls other car parts. The Verifiable Random Function (VRF) is applied to select the node for generating ledger [21] . The VRF is a cryptographic primitive that maps inputs to verifiable pseudo-random outputs [22] [23] . One Blockchain company pioneered the use of VRF to perform secret cryptographic solution to select committees to run the consensus protocol [21] . By applying the VRF, all nodes will have an equal chance to become a miner for generating ledgers without requiring a heavy computation power. The mechanism for protecting the Blockchain is exactly same as the BGG. The governance in the blockchain is followed by the decision making parameter which are includes the prior time just before an attacker catches more than half of the total nodes. We will not take any action until the time when it passes the first passage time and it still have the chance that all nodes are governed by an attacker even an attacker catches less than the half of nodes.
BGG Models for Enhanced BIoV Network
To apply the BGG into the BIoV network structure, the antagonistic game of two players (called "A" and "H") are introduced to describe the blockchain network in a car between a defender and an attacker. Both players compete to build the blocks either for honest or false ones. Let ( , , be probability space for generating blocks for attackers and honest nodes in the blockchain network. They will represent the actions of player A (an attacker) and H (an honest node). Player A builds the blocks with false transactions and sustain respective build the blocks of magnitudes formalized by the process. The processes and are
The game is observed at random times in accordance with the point process which is equivalent with the duration of the PoW (Proof-of-Work) completion in the BIoV network:
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where is the number of the reserved honest nodes from a headquater (HQ) which is F depends on the availability from the HQ. Since, an attacker is win at time 7 / ß otherwise an honest node generates the correct blocks. We shall be targeting the confined game in the view point of player A. The joint functional of the BIoV network model is as follows:
where indicates the total number of nodes (or ledgers) in the BIoV network for Q each car in Fig. 2 . The Theorem BGG-1 (see Appendix A) establishes an explicit formula from (2.7)-(2.10). Based on the Theorem of BGG-1 Q 0 ‰ ß°±°± Q Q # #  Fß [14] , the functional of the process of (2.13) satisfies following
From (2.13)-(2.14), we can find the PGFs (probability generating functions) of the exit index /:
III. B G G S LOCKCHAIN OVERNANCE AME TRATEGY
Let us consider a two-person mixed strategy game, and player H (i.e., a car company) is the person who has two strategies at the observation moment, one step before attackers complete to generate alternative chains with dishonest transactions. Player H has the following strategies: (1) regular operations which implicates that Regular  the BIoV network in a car are running as usual, and (2) the network is Safety  running under the safety mode for avoiding attacks by adding honest nodes from the HQ. In the view of player A (an attacker), he might succeed to catch the blocks or fail to catch. Therefore, the responses of player A would be either "Not Burst" or "Burst." Let us assume that the cost for reserving the additional honest nodes is where is a -, , set of the factors that related with the reserved nodes from a HQ and these related factors could be one value or multiple values. The headquater of the car reserves the certain portion of nodes for protecting the values and the BIoV network. If the attacks succeed to generate alternative blocks within car parts, the network bursts and the whole value of the car will be lost. It still has the chance to burst although the Z defender (or a car company) adds the honest nodes before catching blocks by the attacker. In this case, the cost will be not only the car value but also the reservation cost for additional honest nodes. The normal form of games is as follows:
. Players:
Based on the above conditions, the general cost matrix at the prior time to be burst 7 /" could be composed as follows: the game) and it depends on the strategic decision of player H:
It is noted that the cost for the reserved nodes (i.e., " " operation strategy of Safety player H) should be smaller than the other strategy. It is noted that the number of reserved honest nodes from the HQ is random and this variable has a certain F probability distribution. Let us consider the number of the reserved honest nodes has the binomial distribution with the success probability and the number of trial . The 3 8 PGF of the binomial distribution is as follows:
The total number of reserved nodes that a company owns depends on the cost 8 function and the optimal number of reserved nodes which supported by the HQ.
‡
Similarly, the optimal value is the success probability when the reserved honest 3 ‡ nodes are supported from the HQ. The best combination could be found as
where (at the moment ),
We would like to design the BGG adapted BIoV network that can take the safety operation at the decision making moment . The governance in the Blockchain is 7 /" followed by the decision making parameter. It also means no action until the time 7 /" . It still has the chance that all nodes are governed by an attacker if the attacker catches more than the half of nodes at (i.e., . If the attacker catches 7 / / " " Q # ™ E the less than half of all nodes at (i.e., , then the defender could run 7 / / " " Q # ™ E  the safety mode to avoid the attack at
The total cost for developing the enhanced 7 / Þ BIoV network is as follows:
Memoryless Observation Process BGG Model for BIoV Network
It is assumed that the observation process has the memoryless properties which might be a special condition but very practical for actual implementation on a Blockchain Governance Game. It implies that the defender does not spend additional cost of storing the past information. To build the cost function of the BGG, we can find explicit solutions of ; ! , : E " and the moment of the decision making after finding the first exceed index , the probability (generating function) of the number of blocks " / c d
at the moment .
The functional is defined on the · space of all analytic functions at 0. It is also noted that the formulas (2.7)-(2.10) could be rewritten as follows:
The (aka, the ) is the most important factor to be exit index first exceed level index fully analyzed because the decision making parameters including the marginal mean of and could be calculated easily if the is fully analyzed. It
ß E E exit index could be straight forward once the is found f exit index rom (2.21) and (3.15)-(3.20): 
Since, the observation process has the memoryless properties, the process is exponentially distributed and the functionals from (3.15)-(3.20) are as follows:
where
3.33
From (3.22), 
and, from (3.24), 
IV. O P PTIMIZATION RACTICE
A network security in a BIoV network for each car is considered in this subsection. The strategy for protecting the EBIoV is for supporting the additional nodes to give the less chance that an attacker catches blocks with false control requests. The example in this paper is targeting 16 IoV components for each BIoV network (15 nodes from car parts and 1 nodes from a service center) and the estimated car value is around 50,000 USD (see Table I ). It is noted that the values that describe above are made up only for demonstration purposes. Since, the model of the BGG in the EBIoV network has been analytically solved, the values for the cost function and the calculations of the probability distributions are straight forward. However, it still requires the software implementation by using a programing language. Based on the above conditions, the LP (Linear Programing) model could be described as follows: 
